@Article{cmc.2020.09680,
AUTHOR = {Xiaoling Yu, Chungen Xu, Lei Xu, Yuntao Wang},
TITLE = {Lattice-Based Searchable Encryption Scheme against Inside Keywords Guessing Attack},
JOURNAL = {Computers, Materials \& Continua},
VOLUME = {64},
YEAR = {2020},
NUMBER = {2},
PAGES = {1107--1125},
URL = {http://www.techscience.com/cmc/v64n2/39349},
ISSN = {1546-2226},
ABSTRACT = {To save the local storage, users store the data on the cloud server who offers 
convenient internet services. To guarantee the data privacy, users encrypt the data before
uploading them into the cloud server. Since encryption can reduce the data availability, public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) is developed to achieve the retrieval 
of the encrypted data without decrypting them. However, most PEKS schemes cannot 
resist quantum computing attack, because the corresponding hardness assumptions are 
some number theory problems that can be solved efficiently under quantum computers. 
Besides, the traditional PEKS schemes have an inherent security issue that they cannot 
resist inside keywords guessing attack (KGA). In this attack, a malicious server can guess 
the keywords encapsulated in the search token by computing the ciphertext of keywords 
exhaustively and performing the test between the token and the ciphertext of keywords. 
In the paper, we propose a lattice-based PEKS scheme that can resist quantum computing 
attacks. To resist inside KGA, this scheme adopts a lattice-based signature technique into 
the encryption of keywords to prevent the malicious server from forging a valid 
ciphertext. Finally, some simulation experiments are conducted to demonstrate the 
performance of the proposed scheme and some comparison results are further shown with 
respect to other searchable schemes.},
DOI = {10.32604/cmc.2020.09680}
}