@Article{cmc.2020.011232,
AUTHOR = {Congdong Lv, Ji Zhang, Zhoubao Sun, Gang Qian},
TITLE = {Information Flow Security Models for Cloud Computing},
JOURNAL = {Computers, Materials \& Continua},
VOLUME = {65},
YEAR = {2020},
NUMBER = {3},
PAGES = {2687--2705},
URL = {http://www.techscience.com/cmc/v65n3/40198},
ISSN = {1546-2226},
ABSTRACT = {Cloud computing provides services to users through Internet. This open mode 
not only facilitates the access by users, but also brings potential security risks. In cloud 
computing, the risk of data leakage exists between users and virtual machines. Whether 
direct or indirect data leakage, it can be regarded as illegal information flow. Methods, 
such as access control models can control the information flow, but not the covert 
information flow. Therefore, it needs to use the noninterference models to detect the 
existence of illegal information flow in cloud computing architecture. Typical 
noninterference models are not suitable to certificate information flow in cloud computing 
architecture. In this paper, we propose several information flow models for cloud 
architecture. One model is for transitive cloud computing architecture. The others are for 
intransitive cloud computing architecture. When concurrent access actions execute in the 
cloud architecture, we want that security domain and security domain do not affect each 
other, that there is no information flow between security domains. But in fact, there will be 
more or less indirect information flow between security domains. Our models are
concerned with how much information is allowed to flow. For example, in the CIP model, 
the other domain can learn the sequence of actions. But in the CTA model, the other domain 
can’t learn the information. Which security model will be used in an architecture depends 
on the security requirements for that architecture.},
DOI = {10.32604/cmc.2020.011232}
}