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Computers, Materials & Continua
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DOI: 10.32604/cmc.2024.049017

ARTICLE

A Hybrid and Lightweight Device-to-Server Authentication Technique for the Internet of Things

Shaha Al-Otaibi1, Rahim Khan2,*, Hashim Ali2, Aftab Ahmed Khan2, Amir Saeed3 and Jehad Ali4,*

1Department of Information Systems, College of Computer and Information Sciences, Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, P. O. Box 84428, Riyadh, 11671, Saudi Arabia
2Department of Computer Science, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Mardan, 23200, Pakistan
3Department of Computer Science and IT, UET Peshawar, Jalozai Campus Peshawar, Peshawar, 24240, Pakistan
4Department of AI Convergence Network, Ajou University, Suwon, 16499, South Korea
*Corresponding Authors: Rahim Khan. Email: rahimkhan@awkum.edu.pk; Jehad Ali. Email: jehadali@ajou.ac.kr
Received: 25 December 2023; Accepted: 29 January 2024; Published: 26 March 2024

Abstract: The Internet of Things (IoT) is a smart networking infrastructure of physical devices, i.e., things, that are embedded with sensors, actuators, software, and other technologies, to connect and share data with the respective server module. Although IoTs are cornerstones in different application domains, the device’s authenticity, i.e., of server(s) and ordinary devices, is the most crucial issue and must be resolved on a priority basis. Therefore, various field-proven methodologies were presented to streamline the verification process of the communicating devices; however, location-aware authentication has not been reported as per our knowledge, which is a crucial metric, especially in scenarios where devices are mobile. This paper presents a lightweight and location-aware device-to-server authentication technique where the device’s membership with the nearest server is subjected to its location information along with other measures. Initially, Media Access Control (MAC) address and Advance Encryption Scheme (AES) along with a secret shared key, i.e., λi of 128 bits, have been utilized by Trusted Authority (TA) to generate MaskIDs, which are used instead of the original ID, for every device, i.e., server and member, and are shared in the offline phase. Secondly, TA shares a list of authentic devices, i.e., server Sj and members Ci, with every device in the IoT for the onward verification process, which is required to be executed before the initialization of the actual communication process. Additionally, every device should be located such that it lies within the coverage area of a server, and this location information is used in the authentication process. A thorough analytical analysis was carried out to check the susceptibility of the proposed and existing authentication approaches against well-known intruder attacks, i.e., man-in-the-middle, masquerading, device, and server impersonations, etc., especially in the IoT domain. Moreover, proposed authentication and existing state-of-the-art approaches have been simulated in the real environment of IoT to verify their performance, particularly in terms of various evaluation metrics, i.e., processing, communication, and storage overheads. These results have verified the superiority of the proposed scheme against existing state-of-the-art approaches, preferably in terms of communication, storage, and processing costs.

Keywords: Internet of things; authenticity; security; location; communication

1  Introduction

Due to its overwhelming characteristics, the Internet of Things (IoT) has been used in almost every application domain, especially smart buildings and cities, healthcare, manufacturing, and agriculture. IoT consists of smart devices, i.e., things, with embedded sensing and communication modules to form a self-organized network and is very effective in automatically controlling various activities [1]. These devices are deployed in proximity to the underlined phenomenon and capture data after a defined time interval, which is shared with the nearest server via a secure wireless communication channel. As devices in IoT are densely deployed and communicate via wireless media, therefore, the authenticity of both parties, i.e., source and destination, is crucial and very challenging where both devices, that is, the server and member device, must ensure the authenticity of each other. Additionally, a message may be intercepted by an intruder device and, thus, every message should be encrypted with a secret key, i.e., λ, making it non-readable [2].

Device authentication is among the challenging issues with networks, especially IoTs, where devices, such as source and destination, transmit via wireless communication, which is highly susceptible to unauthorized access and interception of messages [3]. For verification of the intended device, secure handshake-enabled authentication mechanisms are adopted, where every device confirms the legitimacy of the intended device through a challenge that is encrypted using either a secret shared key, i.e., λ. In this mechanism, a series of encrypted messages, i.e., four, are transmitted from both parties, where every device tries to resolve the challenge of the intended device and responds with another message that contains the solution to the challenge along with its own, as shown in Fig. 1. In the literature, numerous mechanisms have been presented to resolve authentication issues, i.e., device-to-device and device-to-server, especially with IoT and other resource-constrained networking infrastructures. An efficient and effective authentication technique is presented by Hajny et al. [4] for the establishment of secure channels through an anonymous verification approach in IoT where the privacy of the intended device is preserved through proper utilization of anonymity.

Figure 1: Generalized device-to-server authentication in the internet of things

Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) has been used along with bit-wise exclusive OR (XOR) and hash functions to form a lightweight device-to-server authentication scheme where devices must ensure to carry out the intended process before the initiation of communication [5]. To ensure the integrity of the transmitted data in an open environment of wireless communication, a decentralized approach that is based on ledgers for the authentication of source and destination devices was developed, where two different layers are utilized, i.e., (i) verification and ledger layers, respectively [6]. Anonymity and biometric approaches, which are very effective due to their strong security, were integrated to develop a trustworthy authentication system, preferably user-based, for the smart healthcare domain, such as the Internet of Medical Things. However, biometric-based approaches are feasible only where the intervention of human beings is required in every aspect of the system, which is not applicable in the majority of IoT application domains. Similarly, a privacy-preserving device-to-device authentication scheme, preferably lightweight, has been developed and implemented in the industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environment. In this approach, devices and server modules are required to collect a secret ID and key, i.e., λ, from a trusted authority in the offline phase. These IDs and keys are then utilized in the authentication process to verify the legitimacy of the intended device in IIoT [7]. A hybrid and effective authentication scheme that has integrated MAC addresses and enhanced on-demand vector approaches makes sure that communication sessions are established only if both devices, i.e., member and server, are legitimate in the IoT [8]. Likewise, a three-factor oriented security scheme has been developed to ensure both anonymity and session key with available resources in wireless sensor networks and IoT [9]. Although these approaches have successfully resolved authenticity issues in particular infrastructures, none of them have considered location-based authentication schemes, which are common in IoT infrastructures. Another issue with existing approaches is device mobility, which is not supported in major schemes. For example, if a module could move from one region or location to another that does not fall within the coverage area of the respective server, then what would happen?

In this paper, the Asymmetric Encryption Scheme (AES) and media access control (MAC) are integrated to form a lightweight authentication approach that is specifically designed for IoT and other resource-limited networks. In this scheme, devices are required to be part of an activity, which is carried out in the offline phase, where registration and secret key-sharing processes are completed. Then, before the actual communication, every device Ci is required to be registered with the closest server module, especially the one deployed in that region. This registration process is subjected to verification of the device’s ID and MaskID, which are provided by TA in the offline phase. Thus, a device Ci becomes a member of a server Sj only if its ID and MaskID are matched with already stored addresses, i.e., those shared by TA. Secondly, both devices, i.e., member and server, are required to verify the legitimacy of the other device through a competitive challenge that is generated and encrypted using its secret key λ. This challenge is resolvable only if the concerned device, i.e., Ci or Sj, has the respective secret shared key. The main contributions to this manuscript are given below:

● A lightweight device-to-server authentication approach, i.e., challenge-oriented, for the Internet of Things.

● A hybrid authentication approach is developed that is comprised of the 128-bit AES and MAC addresses of active devices in IoT and is suitable for other infrastructures as well.

● Authentication system with built-in support for mobility of devices, i.e., Ci, in IoT, where devices move from the coverage area of one server Sj to another Sj+1.

The remaining paper is organized as follows.

In the subsequent section, a comprehensive review of the most relevant literature, preferably those related to the authentication of devices and servers in the IoT, is presented. In Section 3, a detailed description of the proposed region-based authentication scheme is presented, whereas the system model of the proposed system is given in Section 4. In Section 5, a comprehensive analysis of the proposed region-based authentication scheme’s performance in terms of various metrics is presented. Finally, concluding remarks are given.

2  Literature Review

Authenticity of devices, i.e., communication parties (member and server), is among the crucial aspects of the networking infrastructure in general and IoT in particular. The literature is quite bulky on addressing the device’s authenticity issue, therefore, a comprehensive review of only those techniques, that are relevant to the proposed methodology, is presented. In 2016, Amin et al. [10] reported on the development of a two-tier authentication mechanism, which is based on three factors along with a bi-pairing technique, to safeguard an ongoing communication session, especially in the resource’s constraint networking infrastructure. Although this approach was convincing, it was susceptible to offline password guesses and impersonation attacks. A secure certificate-enabled device-to-device authentication technique was developed to guarantee the authorization and integrity of devices & data, respectively. A security certificate and DTLS-enabled handshake approach, which is required to be completed before the actual communication, were introduced to safeguard the integrity & legitimacy of data and devices, respectively [11]. Similarly, an effective & secure scheme to update security keys, i.e., λi, has been designed and developed to resolve vulnerabilities, preferably related to various adversary attacks, in IoT networking infrastructure. This scheme was self-adoptive, a common property required in IoT, and other resources-constrained networks, to adjust itself accordingly, i.e., according to the security requirements of the domain [12]. A verification methodology, that is designed for wearable devices in the smart healthcare domain, has been reported, which is primarily based on a unique addressing methodology to differentiate legitimate devices from adversaries deployed in different parts. Furthermore, this scheme has ensured to preservation of anonymity of communicating parties, preferably through a secure session key, in the smart healthcare domain [13]. An epileptic curve and pre-shared key (PSK) enabled authentication technique has been developed and extensively tested in the resource-constrained environment of IoT networks. Additionally, this system has been designed such that it does not degrade the performance of the smart devices, especially in terms of services, i.e., data capturing and transmission [14]. An interesting lightweight methodology has been reported to preserve privacy and ensure the authenticity of communication parties in the smart healthcare domain. This methodology is based on lightweight functions, such as hash, to enable wearable devices to operate smoothly without compromising on security and privacy measures with the lowest possible communication and processing cost in smart healthcare infrastructures [15]. An updated version of the standard IPv6 security algorithm has been presented to enable its adoption on the Internet of Things where a unique 64-bit identity number is allocated to every member device along with a secure session key, i.e., to ensure privacy and security, especially in smart homes [16]. Likewise, a lightweight device-to-device authentication methodology, i.e., which is designed for the IoT, has been presented to secure ongoing communication sessions from fraudulent devices, i.e., adversaries, in the IoT networks. This scheme is secure against well-known intruder attacks, which are feasible in the open environment of IoT [17]. Apart from these, a COAP protocol-enabled authentication scheme has been developed to safeguard IoT networks from fraudulent users, i.e., adversaries or intruders, with minimum possible authenticity or legitimacy overheads [18]. To ensure the integrity of the transmitted data in the open environment of wireless communication, a decentralized approach, that is based on the ledger, for the authentication of source & destination devices was developed where two different layers are utilized, i.e., verification and ledger layers, respectively [6]. Likewise, an extensive analysis of the artificial intelligence-based secure and anonymous payment scheme has been carried out by Fragkos et al. [19] especially those schemes where the anonymity of source is preserved in E-cash. Anonymity and bio-metric approaches, which are very effective due to their strong security, were integrated to develop a trustworthy authentication system, preferably user-based, for the smart healthcare domain such as the Internet of Medical Things. However, bio-metric-based approaches are feasible only where the intervention of human beings is required in every aspect of the system which is not applicable in the majority of IoT application domains. Similarly, a privacy-preserving device-to-device authentication scheme, preferably lightweight, has been developed and implemented in the industrial Internet of Things environment (IIoTs). In this approach, devices and server modules are required to collect secret IDs and keys, i.e., λ, from a trusted authority in the offline phase. These IDs and keys are then utilized in the authentication process to verify the legitimacy of the intended device in IIoT [20]. A hybrid and effective authentication scheme, which has integrated MAC address & enhanced on-demand vector approaches, to make sure that communication sessions are established only if both devices, i.e., member and server, are legitimate in IoT [8]. Likewise, a three-factor oriented security scheme has been developed to ensure both anonymity and session key with available resources in the wireless sensor networks and IoT [9].

Likewise, a three-phase-enabled authentication scheme has been introduced by Aziz et al. [21], where devices are bound to be registered with the authentication server and vice versa. In the authentication phase, a secret key along with other relevant information is exchanged to ensure the authenticity of both the source and destination module in the IoT network. Even though these schemes are effective in ensuring a secure communication infrastructure, each of these schemes is susceptible to adversary attacks such as denial of service, Replay Attacks, and Edge or Server Impersonation attacks. Moreover, most of these approaches are designed for specific environments or overlay complexes, so their realization is very hard. Thirdly, existing approaches have not considered an important security aspect which is the location of the respective device or server module. Finally, existing approaches do not support the mobility of either member devices or server modules, which is desperately required in different application domains such as smart hospitals where a patient is moved from one ward to another. Therefore, a lightweight, that is suitable for any resource constraint devices, and a secure authentication approach is required to be developed which not is prunes against well-known security or authenticity breaches but is equally effective in terms of minimum processing and communication cost.

3  Proposed Region-Based Authentication Scheme for the Internet of Things

The authentication scheme bounds server devices Sj to maintain secret keys, such as λi, information, and IDs of all client devices Ci, which is feasible for limited or small IoT infrastructures. To resolve this issue, a region-based authentication scheme is presented in this section. This scheme bounds server devices to keep a record of every client device ID, but secret keys λi are maintained region-wise that is each region has a specific secret key λi. A client device interested in communication initiates a request message that contains the device-ID and region-ID, i.e., reference point, and encrypts this message with a shared secret key λi. The concerned server device Sj decrypts this message with a shared secret key λi, which is performed in the offline phase and responds with a server challenge as described in the Eq. (1) with an appended client device ID.

γserver−payload=AES(λi,ψresultant|ηserver|CID)(1)

A client device Ci with a matching ID generates a client challenge for the concerned server device Sj using an Eq. (1), while other devices ignore this message. If a server challenge is collected by an intruder device Di, it needs 2128 iterations to decrypt this message, as λi is known only to both server device Sj and client devices Ci which reside in that region. The server device Sj decrypts this message, which is encrypted using session key µi, and generates an authentication payload that is encrypted with shared secret key λi and broadcasts it. The concerned client device decrypts this message and confirms the server’s authenticity by matching its ηclient with that embedded in the message. This approach not only preserves the authenticity of both server and client devices with a minimum possible set of secret keys λi but saves considerable resources, particularly processing and response time.

Theorem 1: A session initiation process is generated by a device Ci iff Ci ∈ Mem (Sj).

Proof: To create a session initiation request, a secret key λi is needed, which is known only to the member client devices such as C1, C2, and C3, Cn ∈ Mem (Sj). If an intruder device Di, somehow, replicates the ID of a Ci ∈ Mem (Sj), that is either generated or accessed, but still, requires the secret key λi of that region, which needs sophisticated and complex hacking techniques to get it, which is not possible with a resource-limited Di.

Conversely, if a member device Ci initiates a session establishment request Msgrequest and encrypts it with its secret key λi, then server Sj of that region can decrypt this Msgrequest and generate a response message as server challenge ϒserver-challenge. Additionally, if client device Ci+1, that is Ci ∉ Mem (Sj), initiates a session establishment request Msgrequest and decrypts it with its λi, then it is ignored by the server Sj as Ci ∉ Mem (S_{j}). Hence, a session request is initiated by a client device such that Ci ∈ Mem of that Sj, where Mem = {C1, C2, C3, ⋯, Cn}.

4  System Model of the Proposed Region-Based Scheme

The authentication process of both devices, i.e., ordinary (sender or source) & server (destination or receiver) modules, should be completed, preferably through encryption & description within a defined time frame, before the initiation of actual communication in IoT. The notations used in the proposed setup are given below in the Table 1.

In the proposed setup, which is specifically designed for IoT, devices are broadly divided into three groups as given below:

1.    Ordinary device, which is represented by Ci, and deployed in the vicinity of the respective phenomenon. Every device Ci has a unique ID, which is the MAC address in this case.

2.    Server module, represented by Sj, and responsible for receiving captured data values from the authentic devices such that informed decisions are made.

3.    Trusted devices (TA), represented as TAi, can allocate mask IDs with the intended server modules and devices.

It is important to note that TA plays a vital role in the proposed authentication setup for IoT, where every device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, is required to be registered with TA preferably in an offline phase. To ensure this, every device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, is required to be registered through the defined procedure by the respective TA where the device’s IDs, i.e., MAC address in this case, are shared, preferably in encrypted form. Secondly, mask IDs of these devices, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, are computed using the given Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively.

MaskID(Ci)=hash(MACi||AESi)(2)

where Ci represents the complete set of legitimate active devices in IoT, which are divided into different regions.

MaskID(Sj)=hash(MACj||AESj)(3)

where i and j are used to represent the total set of active devices, i.e., Ci, and servers, i.e., Sj, in IoT. These mask IDs are generated for every individual device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, by TA in the offline phase and shared with the respective devices in IoT. Apart from it, every device Ci & server module Sj has a 128-bit unique key, i.e., λi, that is shared by TA through the encrypted message in the offline phase where the probability of intruder’s entry is almost negligible as IoT has not operational yet. Moreover, every device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, is assumed to be a potential candidate for legitimate devices in the offline phase. These processes are described in detail one by one below.

Additionally, the proposed authentication model could be implementable in scenarios where multiple servers, i.e., preferably those located in different infrastructures, are deployed to provide a better communication environment, i.e., with minimum information or packet loss ratio, along with built-in support for mobile devices in the IoT. Secondly, a device Ci should be connected, i.e., will be able to communicate and share captured data values, to a single server, i.e., Sj, at a particular time interval in the IoT. However, if somehow its position is changed, i.e., moved to another location, i.e., in a smart healthcare environment where a patient is moved from one ward to another, then it requires repeating the authentication process with the nearest server Sj+1. Additionally, before its movement, this device must inform the respective server Sj through a short message that it is moving from the coverage area. The respective server module must remove this device from the authentic devices list and, thus, it becomes just a member device. In the future, if this device is interested in communicating with the intended server module, then it must authenticate itself through the described process. Moreover, location information is very critical in the proposed infrastructure as it is used as one of the security measures. As every server module has location information, i.e., reference point, about its member devices, which is shared in the off-line phase, if somehow an authentic device is compromised, then the server module would be able to differentiate the intruder device, which pretends to be an authentic device, by utilizing location information that is the coordinates of the devices. Thus, the proposed approach is compromised only if the intruder device not only knows the MAC address, MaskID, and secret shared key along with the location information of the compromised device, then it will be able to start a proper communication session with the respective server module. However, attaining all these security metrics is far beyond the operational capability of the resource-limited device. However, if we assume that the adversary has a highly sophisticated system with exceptional processing facilities, then it is still very difficult to capture and replicate that information, especially location coordinates, that is reference point, along with ∆T.

The proposed model could easily be extensible and implementable in almost every domain of IoT with minor preferably negligible modifications and, thus, it does not suffer from the scalability issue that is related to most of the existing state-of-the-art approaches. As it is a multiple server-oriented model, therefore, could be extended according to the application requirements, especially in the IoT domain. Secondly, implementation of the proposed model is very easy as it is based on a hierarchical approach, a common approach in IoT infrastructure where devices are bound to share information with the nearest server module through direct communication. Finally, the proposed approach is an ideal solution for the future IoT infrastructure where it is highly likely that devices or server modules could be mobile devices and this service is already available in the proposed model.

4.1 Registration Phase: Devices and Servers with TA

In this phase, every device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, shares its MAC (media access control) address with the respective trusted authority (TA) with an embedded secret key, i.e., μi, used to encrypt messages in the offline phase. TA is responsible for generating mask IDs, i.e., MaskIDi & MaskIDj, for every device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, using Eqs. (2) and (3) respectively and shared with these devices through encrypted messages in IoT. Additionally, TA shares a unique secret key, i.e., λi & λj, with every device and server module, respectively. Initially, every device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, sends its MAC address, preferably in encrypted form, to the respective TA. The concerned TA deciphers this message with his unique secret key λ and generates Mask ID using either Eqs. (2) or (3). These mask IDs are shared with the concerned device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, using an encrypted message, which is carried out through 128-bit AES-enabled secret key λ. As soon as the registration of all devices, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, is completed, then TA shares a complete list of authentic devices, C1…i, with server Sj and vice versa. Thus, every device, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, has a list of legitimate devices, i.e., ordinary Ci or server Sj, in IoT.

In the next phase, every device, Ci, needs to be a registered member of the nearest server module, Sj. For this purpose, a device, Ci, which is interested in communicating with a respective server module Sj, generates a random nonce ψi using Eq. (4) and encrypts it with a secret key, λi using a 128-bit AES encryption scheme.

ψ(Ci)=rand(num)(4)

In addition to it, the device, Ci, computes mask ID, which is a hybrid of random nonce η and mask ID assigned to it in the offline phase. Then, device Ci generates a cipher text message where the payload consists of MAC, mask ID, and random nonce ψ and sends it to the respective server module Sj, which is deployed in the region. As this message is sent in encrypted form, therefore, adversary Ak, if located in the vicinity, will not be able to view its contents.

At server module Sj, the encrypted message is converted into plain text using a secret key, λj that is shared by TA in the offline phase. MAC address and mask ID of requesting device Ci are verified by checking their entry in the authentic devices list, which is shared by TA in the offline phase. If the required attributes, i.e., MAC address & mask ID, are available in the stored list, then requesting device Ci is added to the member devices class of the respective server Sj. However, if either one of these attributes or both are missing, then the server assumes that the requesting device is not trustworthy and may be a potential intruder device. Thus, blacklist it and share this information with the nearest server module, Sj+1 as well.

Theorem 2. A legitimate or registered device Ci, not an intruder Ak, can become a member device with the nearest server Sj.

Proof. Every device Ci gets MaskID and 128-bit AES-based secret key, λi, from TA in the offline phase and the same, i.e., maskID & MAC address of authentic devices, is shared by TA with every server module Sj in the offline phase where the probability of possible entry of potential adversaries or intruder devices Ak is negligible. However, if we assume that an adversary Ak has generated a membership request message, somehow with the same attributes, using its secret key λk, and sent it to the nearest server Sj. It will be rejected as the concerned secret key, λk, is not known to the server module and, thus, will not be able to convert this message into plain text which is a clear indication that the request has come from the adversary. However, if we further assume that adversary Ak has intercepted this message and forwarded an updated version of the original message to the respective server Sj. The server module proceeds to verify the authenticity of the requesting device Ak by (i) searching both attributes, i.e., MAC address and MaskID, in the stored database & expected arrival time ∆T, which is described in Eq. (5).

△T=TRX−TTX(5)

where TTX and TRX represent the transmission and reception time of the concerned message, it is important to note that intruder Ak cannot convert the intercepted message into plain text, modify it, and then transmit it to the respective server Sj. Moreover, as this device Ak did not participate in the offline phase, therefore, its MAC address and MaskID will not be available where information about authentic devices is stored, i.e., MaskID(Ak) ∉ MaskID1…… n and λk ∉ λ1,2,3…n. Hence, it will be identified as an adversary.

Conversely, if this request message is sent by a legitimate device Ci, then as this Ci was part of the offline phase, thus, its information, i.e., MAC address & MaskID, will be stored with the respective server Sj. Therefore, a match will be found, i.e., $MaskID (Ci) ∈ MaskID1,2,3…n and λi ∈ λ1,2,3…n, as soon as this information is searched in the database of any server Sj in IoT. Thus, requesting device Ci is identified as an authentic device and added to the member devices class of the respective server module. Thus, a legitimate or registered device Ci, not an intruder Ak, can become a member device with the nearest server Sj.

Furthermore, secret keys λ1,2,3…n which are assigned to potential authentic devices C1,2,3…n, are formed through equality principles which are given below:

1.    λi of a device Ci = PT ⊕ Round0–9 ⊕ Addrkey ⊕ CT.

2.    λ`i of a device Ci = PT ⊕ Round`0–9 ⊕ Addrkey ⊕ CT

where PT & CT represent plain and cipher text, respectively. Similarly, rkey and round are utilized to represent generated secret keys in round a process to continuously compute unique keys, respectively. In this way, every device Ci is registered with server Sj, which is deployed in the respective location, especially with maximum receive signal strength indicators. Additionally, every server Sj has a list of both member devices Ci, i.e., those sent a request to be a registered member such that ∀i=1nCi∈(Authentic  &  Memberclass) and non-member devices Cl such that ∀l=1mCl∈Authentic.

Apart from that, the proposed authentication model has built-in support for the mobility of authentic devices from the coverage area of one server Sj to another Sj+1 without changing the technological infrastructure and additional resources of IoT. If a device Ci migrates from the coverage area of an Sj to another Sj+1, then it just needs to repeat the procedure for registration with another server module.

4.2 Authentication Phase: Ordinary Devices & Server

This phase is dedicated to the most crucial aspect of the proposed authentication scheme, i.e., authenticity verification of both parties that is both requesting device Ci & respective server Sj, preferably in the presence of intruder devices Ak in IoT. Although both devices, i.e., Ci & Sj, have a stored list, which is shared by TA in the offline phase as described above, of legitimate devices in IoT, an intruder device Ak may likely pretend itself as a legitimate device. Thus, to ensure that only legitimate devices, i.e., Ci & Sj, are permitted to communicate, the authentication process is mandatory to be carried out before the sharing of information or other resources. In the proposed setup, the authentication process of both parties is broadly divided into four (04) subcategories, i.e., (i) Challenge of the Requesting Device Ci (ii) Challenge of the Respective Server Sj (iii) Requesting Device’s Ci Authenticity, and (iv) Respective Server’s Sj Authenticity.

4.2.1 Challenge of the Requesting Device Ci for Respective Server Module

In the proposed setup, if a device Ci has data to be shared with the respective server, however, to preserve the integrity of captured data, the authenticity of the respective server Sj must be confirmed & verified before the information sharing process in IoT. For this purpose, the requesting device generates a cipher text message using 128-bit AES-based encryption, i.e., a challenge for the respective server Sj and easily resolvable if secret key λj is available, consisting of its ID (MAC address, ψCi &Sj, and time), Challserver (Exclusive OR of random nonce & ID), and Sessioni, i.e., ψsession. Random nonce ηdevice is formed through a specifically designed random number function as depicted in Eq. (6).

ηi(Ci=Pseudo−Random())(6)

Secondly, as both devices, i.e., Ci & Sj, are likely to communicate for an entire session, therefore, a one-time usable number, i.e., ψCi &Sj, is generated using Eq. (7). For this purpose, an exclusive OR operation is applied on both the ηi and MAC address of Sj, which is already shared by TA in the offline phase.

ψCi&Sj=ηCi⊕MAC(Sj)(7)

Finally, the challenge for the respective server, i.e., Sj, is formed, which consists of ID, ψCi & Sj, MaskID, and T1 (Transmission time), and converted into cipher text through 128-bit AES-Enabled encryption as depicted in Eq. (8).

γsc=AES(ψCi&Sj⊕MACCi||T1)(8)

where variable sc has been utilized for the effective representation of the source device’s payload and T1 is the actual time of message transmission. This message is very challenging and informative as it contains valuable information required for the verification of both devices in IoT.

4.2.2 Challenge of the Server Sj for the Requesting Device

As soon as the cipher text message transmitted by device Ci is received by the respective server Sj, then it converts it into plain text using a secret key, i.e., λj, which is shared by TA in the offline phase and extracts information stored in the message payload. Initially, server Sj confirms the authenticity of device Ci through a comprehensive methodology where the MAC address of this device is searched in the stored address, which is verified through Eq. (9). This device, i.e., Ci, is considered as authentic if and only if the MAC(Ci) ∈ stored (MACreg).

AuthenticCi=∃inMACi∈Class(MACj)(9)

Secondly, the authenticity of this device Ci is further confirmed through another metric, i.e., message delivery time, which is computed using Eq. (10) as given below:

ΔT=T2−T1(10)

where T1 & T2 represent transmission and delivery time respectively. Secondly, the CIDi of the respective source device is matched against the legitimate devices using the Eq. (9).

Alternatively, if the MAC address of device Ci has not been found in the stored database, then the respective server Sj assumes that requesting device may be a potential intruder device and, thus, add its MAC address to the blacklisted class. Similarly, if the expected packet delivery time does not fall within the permitted bounds, then this scenario is also considered a potential security breach, and the device’s MAC address is added to the blacklisted class. If device Ci is verified as authentic, then server Sj generates a challenge for the respective device to further confirm its legitimacy. To ensure this, random nonce extracted from the cipher message is used, which is an indicator for the respective device Ci that Sj is an authentic server and can be trusted for sharing information.

This number, i.e., ηi(Ci), along with its MAC address is passed through exclusive OR operation to generate 128 bits ψCi &Sj as given below in Eq. (11).

ψCi&Sj=MACj⊕ηi(Ci)(11)

The idea behind using the same ηi(Ci), i.e., in the server challenge, is to ensure the requesting device Ci that message has been successfully converted into plain text by a trusted device, which is possible only if receive the module, i.e., Sj in this case, has the secret shared key, λi, which is shared by TA during the offline phase. Sever Sj then generates its challenge, i.e., γsc for the respective device Ci by passing the result of Eq. (11) and its MAC address of Ci through exclusive OR operation as given below in Eq. (12).

γsc=AES(ψCi&Sj⊕MACCi||T3)(12)

where sc & T3 represent the message payload and transmission time of the server modules, respectively.

Theorem 2. Cipher text message, i.e., γsc, is convertible into the respective plain text iff Ci OR Ak has one of the unique secret keys, i.e., λ1…i.

Proof. If we assumed that this cipher message, i.e., server’s challenge γsc, is somehow intercepted by a non-member device, i.e., potential intruder Ak, that is placed in closed proximity of server Sj, then it will try to read & alter its contents, but to do so, Ak requires to convert this message into plain text, which is possible only, if it has one of the secret key, i.e., λ1…i. As it is an intruder, therefore, it will utilize various keys, i.e., λ1…k, through a head & trial procedure that is function f(k), where success probability is directly proportional to the set of secret keys, i.e., λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4,… λn, such as given in Eq. (13).

f(y)=∃i=1k[∴λk∈λ1,λ2,λ3,…λn&MAC(Ak)ϵStoredMAC](13)

For this purpose, intruder device Ak is required to generate a random key, i.e., λk, which must be identical to one of the legitimate secret keys, i.e., λ1,λ2,λ3,…λn, through a mathematical Eq. (14) as given below:

λk=Head&Trials[statistics(λi⊕λj)]ORRandomkey(AES−128)(14)

First, it is hard for the intruder device Ak to convert this message into plain text form using the head & trial technique as described in Eq. (14), but it is a time-consuming and lengthy process. However, if we further assume that somehow, it did, then there is another parameter (timestamp), i.e., ∆T, that is used to verify the integrity of the intercepted message. Converting a 128-bit AES-based cipher text message into plain is a lengthy process and, thus, it is very hard for intruder Ak to deceive the respective server Sj with its interpreted & updated message. As the updated message will have a different timestamp than what is expected from the legitimate device, therefore, message will be discarded by server Sj.

Conversely, if the cipher message is intercepted by an authentic member device Ci, then it will convert this message, i.e., γsc, into proper plain text using its secret key λi, which is shared by TA in the offline phase. Additionally, an authentic device can generate a response message within the stipulated time interval, i.e., ∆T. Thus, it proves that a 128-bit AES-based cipher text message, i.e., $γsp, is convertible into plain text form only, if the device Ci has a legitimate secret key, i.e., λi.

4.2.3 Device Authenticity through Resolving Server Challenge

The authentication process of the requesting device is subjected to registration of (i) MAC address (ii) MaskID, (iii) ∆T should be as expected, (iv) successful conversion of server challenge, i.e., γSj, and (v) generate a challenge, i.e., γCi, for the respective server within the stipulated time interval. Thus, server Sj verifies the authenticity of device Ci using Eq. (15).

AuthenticCi=MACi∈RegisteredMAC(Sj)  &  MaskID∈RegisteredMaskID(Sj)&  ψSj∈γCi  &  ΔT  is  as  expected(15)

In response to server challenge, i.e., γSj, the concerned device Ci generates a cipher text message, i.e., with its 128-bit secret key, which contains an exact copy of the random number, i.e., ψSj, is server challenge, i.e., γSj. Additionally, this message is ciphered through one of the legitimate secret keys, i.e., λi∈λ1,λ2,λ3,…λn, which are already registered with server Sj.

Secondly, if server Sj received a challenge from the respective device Ci, which contains a random number, i.e., ψSj, n it is an indication that device Ci requesting authentication is a legitimate device with its secret key, i.e., λi. Thirdly, if server Sj converts & resolves the challenge of the requesting device Ci, then it points out the legitimacy of Ci, as server Sj can convert only those messages to plain text form, which are ciphered through one of the legitimate secret keys, i.e., λi∈λ1,λ2,λ3,…λn.

Theorem 3. The challenge of server Sj, i.e., γSj, is resolved if and only if, device Ci is legitimate with authentic key, i.e., λi.

Proof. Let us consider that, the challenge of server Sj, i.e., γSj, is intercepted by an adversary Ak, deployed somewhere in the middle of Sj & Ci and begins to convert this challenge, i.e., in cipher text form using its secret key, i.e., λk, which is generated using Eq. (16).

λk=Head  &  Trials[Probabilistic(λ1,2,3,…n⊕λ1,2,3,…m)]ORRandom(AES−128)(16)

In addition to the Eq. (16), adversary Ak may utilize a probabilistic function, i.e., G (x), where knowledge about the nature of the legitimate devices, Ci, is used to find an actual correlation between MAC address and secret keys (expected not actual) and it is based on head & trial method, i.e., λi, through Eq. (17) as given below:

G(x)=PROB(MAC(C1),(λ1,2,3,…k),MAC(C2),(λ1,2,3,…k),…MAC(Cn),(λ1,2,3,…k))(17)

To carry out these tasks, adversary Ak should closely monitor every ongoing communication(s) with the respective server Sj and will try to find certain patterns. However, to convert a 128-bit AES-based encrypted message into plain text form, a secret shared key, i.e., λi, is required, which is possible to break only, if Ak applies 2128 keys one after another. Keeping in mind the complexity of the 128-bit AES-based secret key, i.e., λi, it is not possible for adversary Ak, particularly by considering the limited processing power of these devices, to resolve the server’s Sj challenge within the specified time frame.

Conversely, if a challenge, i.e., γSj, generated by authentic device Sj is intercepted by the intended device Ci$, then Ci uses its key λi to convert it into proper plain text format, extract information from the payload and will send a reply message, ηsc, within the expected time frame as key, i.e., λi∈λ1,λ2,λ3,…λn, which are shared during the offline phase. Thus, the challenge of server Sj is resolved if and only if, device Ci is legitimate with an authentic key, i.e., λi.

4.2.4 Server’s Authenticity through Resolving Device’s Challenge

In the previous phase, server Sj has verified the legitimacy of the requesting device Sj through server challenge, i.e., γSj, which is resolved by the concerned, however, the authenticity of Sj is still questionable and requires to be confirmed by the respective device Ci. For this purpose, device Ci uses (i) MAC address and (ii) MaskID of the respective server by reading the content of the message’s payload, i.e., γSj. However, to further verify it, device Ci creates a challenge, i.e., γCi in response to the server Sj challenge as depicted in Eq. (18) and send it in the cipher text form. Additionally, device Ci embeds a random number, i.e., ηCi, in the message’s payload and expects to receive a reply within the expected time frame.

γsc=AES[MAC(Sj)⊕ψCi&Sj||T3](18)

where ψCi&Sj is generated using Eq. (19).

ψCi&Sj=MACj⊕ηi(Ci)(19)

This message is transmitted in cipher text form, i.e., encrypted with 128-bit AES-based key λi, and, thus, covert-able to plain text form only if intercepting device, i.e., legitimate Sj or intruder Ak, has the required secret key, i.e., λj. Now, this message may be intercepted by an intruder device Ak or a legitimate server Sj, both will try to extract information contained in the payload section of the message, i.e., γCi. If an adversary intercepts this message, i.e., γCi, and tries to extract information contained in the payload section. However, γCi is required to be converted to plain text form, which is applicable only if the secret key, i.e., λi, is available. As adversary Ak does not have the secret shared key, i.e., λi, therefore, it may try to convert this message into plain text using the head & trail procedure, which is time-consuming and most probably less successful as far as security of 1128-bit AES-based encryption is concerned. Through the successful exchange of these messages, i.e., i.e., γCi & i.e., γSj, authenticity of both modules is verified.

Finally, the proposed authentication model ensures that a device can move from the coverage area of the respective server to another. However, before its movement, the device must inform the concerned server about its planned movement, preferably through a short message that is encrypted using its secret key. As soon as the server module receives this message, it will change the status of this device from authentic to member device only. Secondly, when this device enters the coverage area of another server module, then it will initiate the respective authentication process as described above. A possible case study is a patient admitted in the respective ward-A of a smart IoT-enabled hospital where patients are attached to wearable devices to monitor their status. These wearable devices are directly attached to the respective server module deployed in the concerned ward or building and could allow these wearable devices after a rigorous authentication process. Now, if a patient needs a CT scan OR other tests that are not possible in the same building and, thus, patients could be taken to the respective block. In this case, wearable devices attached to the patient’s body leave a message to the concerned server and when these devices enter the coverage area of another server, the authentication process is triggered again to become authentic members of the new server module.

However, the proposed model is well equipped against well-known intruder attacks such as denial of services, man in the middle, reply attacks, device and server impersonation attacks, and masquerading attacks. However, the security and applicability of the proposed authentication model are solely based on the offline line phase, which is assumed to be non-accessible for the intruder module. However, if an adversary attends the offline phase, somehow, then it will be assumed as a legitimate device as it will take part in all activities that are carried out. Moreover, it is important to note that TA does not confirm the legitimacy of the request, especially in the offline phase as it has assumed that this phase is secure from adversary attacks.

5  Simulation and Analytical Results

To verify various claims of the proposed authentication scheme, it is implemented in NS-2, an opensource simulation software, where every device, i.e., Ci, is assumed to communicate with the nearest server module, especially with minimum possible distance or maximum received signal strength indicator (RSSI) in IoT. The proposed lightweight authentication along with existing state-of-the-art approaches are developed and comparison is carried out in terms of approximate processing and communication time intervals. Apart from that, these schemes were thoroughly checked in terms of bandwidth utilization and additional overheads. A detailed discussion of these parameters is provided in the following subsections.

5.1 Processing Time of the Proposed and Existing Techniques in the Internet of Things

Processing time is defined as the time taken by a particular methodology or approach to verify the authenticity of the communication party, i.e., the source that is device Ci and destination (server Sj) in this case, in IoT infrastructure. Therefore, a newly developed authentication approach is assumed to be acceptable if and only if it has achieved the minimum possible processing time than existing approaches preferably under similar environmental, i.e., devices, and infrastructure of IoT. To verify this assumption, a comparative analysis of both proposed and existing authentication approaches is reported in Table 2 where exclusive R (XOR) and hash functions are used as the evaluating metrics. From Table 2, we have observed that the proposed lightweight approach verifies the legitimacy of both parties, i.e., source Ci & destination Sj, with minimum possible processing overheads. Additionally, the proposed authentication has built-in support for mobile devices, which is very common in different application areas such as hospitals, where device Ci must be authentic and has taken part in the offline phase whereas the majority of the existing approaches do not support mobility of either device or server in the active IoT.

5.2 Proposed and Existing Scheme’s Communication Cost Overhead

Apart from the processing cost, these schemes, i.e., proposed AES-enabled lightweight and existing approaches, are thoroughly evaluated in terms of bandwidth requirements, which are assumed to be among the top priority resources in every networking infrastructure, to ensure timely transmission of the respective information in IoT. From this perspective, an authentication approach, i.e., existing or proposed, is assumed to be the best choice if its bandwidth requirements are at the minimum possible level, however, it should not compromise on overall speed and performance of the IoT. A comparison of these approaches in terms of communication or transmission overhead is depicted in Table 3where the total number of bits transmitted by technique are shown especially those required to complete the authentication process between device and server. From the results, we conclude that the proposed lightweight authentication is a more suitable candidate than existing approaches for IoT environments where communication parties are required to be verified first. Secondly, the proposed scheme supports both static and mobile devices, which is very common in the IoT.

5.3 Memory or Storage Overhead Metric in IoT

Memory or storage is an equally important evaluation metric especially when the resource-limited nature of member devices in IoT is concerned as it is mandatory for the smooth operation of the underlined networks. In Table 4, a detailed comparative analysis of the proposed lightweight and existing state-of-the-art methodologies is presented which shows that the proposed scheme has outperformed. In the proposed scheme, a device Ci is required to store its MastkID & secret shared key, i.e., λ, which are received from the TA in the offline phase. Additionally, minor space is required to store a list of authentic servers, i.e., Sj, which is required in scenarios where devices are mobile.

5.4 Security Analysis in Terms of Numerous Possible Attacks in IoT

Finally, the proposed lightweight authentication approach is thoroughly checked against well-known adversary attacks especially those that are linked to the IoT infrastructure, and the resilience of the existing & proposed approach is depicted in Table 5. From this table, the proposed scheme is well-equipped and is pruned against well-known attacks specifically those carried out by adversary devices to make entry in IoT or degrade its overall operation by sending false messages. The proposed system has been thoroughly checked against these attacks using a simulation environment, i.e., OMNET++, where every possible scenario related to the requesting process of a legitimate device to that of intruders or adversaries. Simulation results have confirmed that the proposed scheme is pruned against these well-known intruder attacks. The proposed approach is pruned against these attacks due to its two layers of security, i.e., MAC-based authentication and AES-128-enabled encryption that is based on a secret shared key.

6  Conclusion

In Internet of Things (IoT) networking infrastructures, the authenticity of communication modules, i.e., devices and servers, is mandatory to ensure the integrity of transmitted data and the privacy of source and destination devices, particularly in the presence of adversary modules. In this paper, we have developed a sophisticated, yet lightweight authentication approach designed specifically for resource-limited devices. This approach can differentiate legitimate device Ci from the adversary(s) in the IoT. The proposed approach is a hybrid of MAC and 128-bit AES to ensure that every communication session, along with handshaking, is secured against outside access in any way. Secondly, the device’s mobility, i.e., moving from one position to another, is supported, and mobile devices do not require additional information for this purpose. The proposed lightweight approach is resilient against nearly all adversary attacks, especially those applicable to the IoT environmental infrastructure. Finally, the contributions of the proposed authentication scheme are verified through a sophisticated analysis of the simulation results.

Acknowledgement: Not applicable.

Funding Statement: Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University Researchers Supporting Project Number (PNURSP2023R136), Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Author Contributions: The authors confirm their contribution to the paper as follows: study conception and design: Shaha Al-Otaibi, Rahim Khan; data collection: Shaha Al-Otaibi; analysis and interpretation of results: Rahim Khan, Aftab Ahmed Khan, Jehad Ali; draft manuscript preparation: Shaha Al-Otaibi, Rahim Khan, Jehad Ali. All authors reviewed the results and approved the final version of the manuscript.

Availability of Data and Materials: Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study.

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