Open Access
ARTICLE
Identifying and Verifying Vulnerabilities through PLC Network Protocol and Memory Structure Analysis
Joo-Chan Lee1, Hyun-Pyo Choi1, Jang-Hoon Kim1, Jun-Won Kim1, Da-Un Jung1, Ji-Ho Shin1, Jung-Taek Seo1, *
1 Department of Information Security Engineering, Soonchunhyang University, Asan, 31538, Korea.
* Corresponding Author: Jung-Taek Seo. Email: .
Computers, Materials & Continua 2020, 65(1), 53-67. https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2020.011251
Received 29 April 2020; Accepted 25 May 2020; Issue published 23 July 2020
Abstract
Cyberattacks on the Industrial Control System (ICS) have recently been
increasing, made more intelligent by advancing technologies. As such, cybersecurity for
such systems is attracting attention. As a core element of control devices, the
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) in an ICS carries out on-site control over the ICS. A
cyberattack on the PLC will cause damages on the overall ICS, with Stuxnet and Duqu as
the most representative cases. Thus, cybersecurity for PLCs is considered essential, and
many researchers carry out a variety of analyses on the vulnerabilities of PLCs as part of
preemptive efforts against attacks. In this study, a vulnerability analysis was conducted on
the XGB PLC. Security vulnerabilities were identified by analyzing the network protocols
and memory structure of PLCs and were utilized to launch replay attack, memory
modulation attack, and FTP/Web service account theft for the verification of the results.
Based on the results, the attacks were proven to be able to cause the PLC to malfunction
and disable it, and the identified vulnerabilities were defined.
Keywords
Cite This Article
J. Lee, H. Choi, J. Kim, J. Kim, D. Jung
et al., "Identifying and verifying vulnerabilities through plc network protocol and memory structure analysis,"
Computers, Materials & Continua, vol. 65, no.1, pp. 53–67, 2020.