Xingyun Hu1,2, Siqi Lu1,2,*, Liujia Cai1,2, Ye Feng1,2, Shuhao Gu1,2, Tao Hu1, Yongjuan Wang1,2,*
CMC-Computers, Materials & Continua, Vol.88, No.1, 2026, DOI:10.32604/cmc.2026.079484
- 08 May 2026
Abstract With the widespread adoption of web applications and cloud services, the OAuth 2.0-based OpenID Connect (OIDC) Single Sign-on (SSO) protocol has become the core of modern digital identity authentication. Although the OIDC protocol itself has strict security specifications, its implementation in real-world web frameworks can introduce critical vulnerabilities, particularly the improper omission of the state parameter, which leads to severe authentication forgery risks. Existing research often overlooks these implementation-level flaws, especially from a formal analysis perspective. This paper addresses this gap by formally analyzing the authentication forgery attack resulting from the missing state parameter. We construct… More >